Two classes of distributions that are widely used in the analysis of Bayesian auctions are the monotone hazard rate (MHR) and regular distributions. They can both be characterized in terms of the rate of change of the associated virtual value functions: for MHR distributions, the condition is that for values
INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent computer science research on revenue-maximizing auctions uses Bayesian analysis to measure auction performance (see Hartline [14] for an overview), although there is also a considerable body of work on worst-case revenue maximization (see Hartline and Karlin [15] ). Typically, the analyses seek to compare the revenue for the given mechanism to a measure of the optimal revenue, expressing this as an approximation factor.
In Bayesian analyses, the bidders valuations are assumed to be drawn from one or more distributions, either one common distribution for all bidders or separate distributions for distinct groups of 18:2 R. Cole and S. Rao bidders, possibly with each bidder being in a distinct group. Almost all previous Bayesian analyses have been for one of three settings: all distributions, regular distributions, and monotone hazard rate (MHR) distributions, with MHR being the more restrictive. For example, Myerson's analysis [18] of the expected revenue of the optimal auction for the sale of a single item is most natural when the buyer values are independently drawn from regular value distributions (different buyers may have values drawn from distinct distributions). Many other results, including those we will consider in this article, are currently known only for MHR distributions, and for the most part do not extend to regular distributions.
Recently, Cole and Roughgarden [9] introduced the notion of α-strongly regular distributions, α-SR distributions for short; these interpolate between MHR and regular distributions. They gave two examples of settings for which results previously shown for MHR distributions extended smoothly to α-SR distributions. However, the main focus of their work was to investigate what happens in auctions, and in Myerson's auction in particular, when distributions are known only approximately via sampling rather than exactly, and how to analyze the resulting expected revenue as a function of the number of samples.
In independent work, Schweizer and Szech [19] identified the same notion, which they term λregularity, where λ corresponds to 1 − α . They proved this is equivalent to ρ-concavity, an earlier, albeit less intuitive characterization of this class of distributions. ρ-concavity was introduced by Caplin and Nalebuff [5, 6] in the context of Bertrand oligopoly. Later it was studied by Anderson and Renault [2] in the context of Cournot competition; they effectively showed the equivalence of ρ-concavity to the α-SR condition, for α = 1 + ρ. See also Ewerhart [12] .
In this article, we carry out a more thorough investigation of α-SR distributions, and specifically to what extent known results for MHR distributions extend to α-SR distributions. We consider five auction settings, listed in Table 1 . For each problem, we show that the prior result extends smoothly. In addition, for four of these problems, the auction uses knowledge of the distribution in its decision making. For these settings, we propose variants of the auctions that allow efficiency in terms of revenue to be maintained, and we also determine how the expected revenue varies as a function of the number of samples.
The technical challenges in this work were twofold. First, we had to extend a variety of results concerning properties of MHR distributions to α-SR distributions. Although some of these results are straightforward extensions of analogous results for MHR distributions, in other cases new proofs were needed, as the previous arguments depended on convexity properties that need not hold outside the MHR domain. For the most part, once these new results were obtained, analyzing the auction revenue was simply a matter of replacing an MHR bound with the corresponding α-SR bound, as illustrated in Section 3.
Second, in working with samples, we had to adjust some of the mechanisms to take account of the fact that they were using an approximation of the actual distributions. For example, for the result in Theorem 9, we take the apparently optimal solution based on the approximate distributions and truncate it suitably; the resulting solution achieves an approximation factor similar to what is obtained given exact distributions.
Schweizer and Szech [19] also prove results concerning α-SR distributions. For the most part, these results have a more structural flavor than the results in this article. However, the main bound in their Lemma 6 is the same as Lemma 5 in this work, and the bound in their Proposition 4 is the same as Lemma 9 in this work (the proofs appear to be quite different, however). Although they do not delve into the specific bounds achieved in applications, they identify an essentially disjoint set of applications to which the α-SR generalization of MHR bounds can be applied, including those found in various works [1, 3, 8, 10, 13] . 
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Finally, Schweizer and Szech develop a notion of λ * -regularity, generalizing λ-regularity. This is an alternative to hyperregularity, a notion proposed by Kleinberg and Yuan [17] , which had been used to obtain revenue to welfare bounds in single parameter mechanisms.
In sum, our work strongly suggests that results that hold with respect to MHR distributions will often degrade gracefully when extended to α-SR distributions. The one result that we did not succeed in extending was Theorem 3.14 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] . It would be interesting to know if there are problems for which there is no graceful degradation. Our work also suggests that the optimal mechanism given full knowledge of the distributions may need nontrivial modifications to achieve good performance when faced with sample-based empirical distributions.
Our results are shown in Table 1 . Column 2 gives known results for MHR distributions expressed as an approximation factor; column 3 gives the corresponding results for α-SR distributions; and column 4, where applicable, shows the results under sampling of the distributions. In addition, δ , ξ , and γ are parameters used to specify the number m of samples and which need to satisfy γ ξm ≥ 4, (1 + γ ) 2 ≤ 3/2, and m ≥ 6(1+γ ) γ 2 ξ max{ ln 3 γ , ln 3 δ }. Reasonable choices are ξ = δ , δ = γ /k, and γ ≤ 1/5 as small as needed to give the desired approximation factor (except for Theorem 7, where δ = γ /n). All sampling results assume that there are k classes of bidders each with their own distribution, and n bidders in total. Note that when α tends to 1, the limit values for all bounds in column 3 are the prior known bounds for MHR distributions.
Our goal with this work is twofold. First, we aim to show that results for MHR distributions can often be extended to α-SR distributions. Second, by providing a toolkit of results about α-SR distributions, it is our hope to encourage other authors to attempt to extend their MHR results to α-SR distributions.
In Section 2, we review some standard definitions and results. In Section 3, we prove Theorems 1 through 5 (the results in column 3 in Table 1 ). In Section 4, we explore what happens when the distributions are known approximately via samples, proving Theorems 6 through 9 (the results in column 4).
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Valuations and Utilities
In the auctions that we consider, each participant or bidder, b i , is assumed to have a valuation function v i : X → R + that gives a nonnegative value v i (x ) to each possible allocation x ∈ X , where X is the set of possible allocations. The buyer will have to pay a price p(x ) for its allocation, and its
Usually, u i (x ) ≥ 0 (i.e., a purchase occurs only if the value is at least the price).
Oftentimes, the possible allocations are constrained in one way or another. In particular, if any allocation comprises of a set of items, we say that the environment is downward closed if, for any feasible allocation (y 1 , y 2 , . . . ,y n ) to bidders b 1 , . . . ,b n , respectively, any (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), with x i ⊆ y i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is also a feasible allocation.
As stated in Section 1, the bidders valuations for items are drawn from a probability distribution. Accordingly, we define the revenue curve, R(p), a function of the prices. Given a price p,
For regular distributions, this is a convex function with R(0) = 0 = R(∞). We will often let F refer to the cumulative probability distribution (i.e.,
Recall that for a distribution F , the virtual valuation ϕ (v) is given by
where f is the derivative of F . Sometimes we might define F on a discrete set {1, . . . , L}, for some L, in which case we define the virtual valuation as
where F (0) = 0. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that F is a continuous distribution. It is often useful to use the hazard rate,
is a nondecreasing function and h is nonnegative. Given a value v, it can be useful to refer to the quantile, q(v) = 1 − F (v). Additionally, we let v (q) be the value at quantile q.
Also recall that the monopoly reserve price, the reserve price for short, is the least price r such that ϕ (r ) ≥ 0.
The following definition of α-SR distributions was introduced in Cole and Roughgarden [9] .
Note that MHR distributions are 1-SR and regular distributions are 0-SR. If F is a continuous distribution, then Definition 1 is equivalent to stating that dϕ dv ≥ α.
Regular and Monotone Hazard Rate Distributions
Monotone hazard rate distributions include many standard distributions that are not heavy tailed, including the uniform, normal, and exponential distributions. The exponential distribution is on the boundary of MHR and non-MHR distributions.
Many of the distributions that are regular but non-MHR are more heavy tailed, but not too heavy tailed. Here the limiting distribution is the equal-revenue distribution-that is, the distribution for which p · Pr[v ≥ p] is fixed.
Many societal settings (populations of cities, distribution of incomes, etc.) can be described by heavy-tailed distributions. Accordingly, it seems natural in auction settings to consider valuation distributions that are heavy tailed. Oftentimes, however, no good bounds can be attained with the equal revenue distribution. Thus, it seems natural to consider heavy tailed, but not as heavy-tailed distributions, and the α-SR notion provides a way to characterize such distributions.
The following worst-case α-SR distributions, first given in Cole and Roughgarden [9] , can be used to show that several of our results are tight. In particular, these distributions satisfy the requirements of F α later in Lemma 2.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that the statement of the lemma does not hold. In particular, assume that there are v 2 and v 4 
where f and f α are the density functions, or derivatives, of F and F α , respectively.
Suppose that the function
However, the right-hand side is equal to
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS FOR α -SR DISTRIBUTIONS
The versions of all of Theorems 1-5 for MHR distributions rely on various quantitative properties of MHR distributions. The new results depend on generalizing these properties to α-SR distributions; some of these extensions are quite non-trivial.
Revenue of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves With Duplicates
Theorem 1 bounds the expected revenue of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) with duplicates as described in Hartline and Roughgarden [16] . Recall that the VCG mechanism chooses the feasible set of bidders with the maximum total value to be the winners and charges each bidder appropriately. With duplicates, VCG is run on the set of bidders, along with a single additional copy of each bidder, so that each bidder and its copy have independent and identical distributions on their valuations, are interchangeable, and cannot both be part of the winning set of bidders. In Theorem 1, as α tends to 1, our bound on the approximation factor tends to 3, the tight bound previously achieved for MHR distributions in Hartline and Roughgarden [16] .
For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn independently from distributions that are α-SR, the expected revenue of VCG with duplicates is a 2+α αapproximation to the expected revenue of the optimal mechanism without duplicates.
Proof. Lemma 3 below replaces Lemma 4.1 in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in Hartline and Roughgarden [16] . The rest of the proof is unchanged. Lemma 3. Let 0 < α < 1, let F be an α-SR distribution, and let ϕ be its virtual valuation function. Then for all t,
Later, in Lemma 5, we prove Lemma 3 for the case t = 0, which it turns out is when the bound is tightest, as we later show in concluding the proof of Lemma 3.
To prove Lemma 5, we will use the following structural properties of α-SR distributions F and their density functions f :
(2) The single crossing property
Lemma 4. Let 0 < α < 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution. Then
Proof. We start by defining the distribution G by rescaling F 's argument so that
As G is obtained by rescaling F 's argument, it is easy to see that G is also α-SR, and that
Therefore, proving the lemma for G implies the lemma for F . Let G α be defined analogously with respect to the worst-case distribution F α . A straightforward calculation shows that the distribution G α satisfies the inequality in the lemma. Therefore, it is enough to prove that
(1)
As both G and G α are normalized so that
we can show (1), and consequently the lemma, by showing that
We apply Lemma 2 to G and G α . Because G α is the normalized version of the worst-case distribution, the conditions of Lemma 2 hold. It follows that there exists a v 0 such that
Both 1 − G and 1 − G α are decreasing functions, and hence so is
Proof. We first note that the equality follows by Myerson's lemma [18] . (For as the values are drawn from the same distribution, the optimal auction is simply a second price auction, and its expected revenue is given by
Therefore,
By applying Lemma 4, we see this is bounded above by
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 5, Lemma 3 holds when t = 0. We now prove the result for t > 0. Let C (α ) = ( 2+α α ), and note that as F is regular, ϕ is increasing, and hence max(ϕ (v 1 ), ϕ (v 2 )) = ϕ (max{v 1 , v 2 }). Then by substituting max{v 1 
We rewrite this as
is always nondecreasing as a function of max{v 1 , v 2 }. Additionally, we note that 1/C (α ) ≤ α. Therefore, conditioning on the event that max{v 1 , v 2 } ≥ t only increases the expected value.
Revenue of the VCG-L Mechanism
The VCG-L mechanism, as defined in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] , is used in settings in which each bidder has an attribute (a classification) and for each attribute there is a corresponding known distribution from which the bidder's valuation is drawn. The VCG-L mechanism uses the monopoly reserve prices, one per bidder, as defined in Section 2, as follows. First, the VCG mechanism is run. Second, all bidders whose valuation is less than their reserve price are removed. Finally, each winning bidder is charged the larger of its reserve price and its VCG payment from the first step.
In Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] , the expected revenue of the VCG-L mechanism on MHR distributions was shown to achieve a 1/e approximation of the welfare, or efficiency, of the VCG mechanism, which is tight. In Theorem 2, we extend the analysis to α-distributions; the bound is again tight, as shown by the case of a single bidder drawn from the worst-case distribution F α . We note that the mechanism does not achieve a constant factor approximation in the case of regular distributions [11] . Theorem 2. For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn independently from α-SR distributions where 0 < α < 1, the expected revenue of the VCG-L mechanism with monopoly reserves is at least an α 1/(1−α ) fraction of the expected efficiency of the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Later, Lemma 9 replaces Lemma 3.10 in the proof of Theorem 3.11 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] . The rest of the proof is unchanged.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the fact that (α + 1)/α ≤ α −1/(1−α ) , shown in Lemma 6, and lower and upper bounds on the hazard rate h(v), given in Lemmas 7 and 8, respectively.
Proof. By rearranging the terms, we see that proving the lemma is equivalent to proving that (α + 1) 1−α ≤ (1/α ) α . We replace α with 1/x, and therefore it is enough to prove that for x > 1, Again, by rearranging terms, it is enough to show that
The left-hand side is at most e, and therefore the inequality is true when x ≥ e − 1. When x < e − 1, using the power series expansion for the left-hand side, we can bound it by
The right-hand side is bounded above by 1 + x if and only if 3x − 1 ≤ 2x 2 , which holds when x > 1, as desired.
In the proof of Lemma 9, and other lemmas, we often refer to the cumulative hazard rate,
We can relate F and H by the following identity, which follows by differentiating ln ( 
The following lemma gives a lower bound on h(v), which will be used in Lemma 9.
For instance,
, from which the desired inequality follows.
Using almost the same proof as earlier, we obtain the following upper bound on h(v), also used in Lemma 9. This result was also shown in Cole and Roughgarden [9] for the special case of v 2 = r , where r is the monopoly reserve price. Lemma 8. Let 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution with virtual valuation function ϕ. Then
As in the proof of Lemma 7,
then taking the reciprocal of both sides yields the desired inequality.
Note that for continuous distributions, the condition 1/h(v 2 ) − (1 − α )(v 2 − v 1 ) > 0 holds when v 2 = r , where r is the reserve price, as 1/h(r ) = r . Also note that Lemmas 7 and 8 hold in the case that F is defined on a discrete set.
We now state and prove Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. Let 0 < α < 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution, with monopoly reserve price r and revenue function R. Let V (t ) denote the expected welfare of a single-item auction with a posted price of t and a single bidder with valuation drawn from F . For every nonnegative number t ≥ 0,
Proof. As in the proof in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] of the corresponding lemma for MHR distributions, we split this into two cases: t ≤ r and t ≥ r . In both cases, we can write the left-hand side as s · (1 − F (s) 
We start from the fact that
as shown in Lemma 3.10 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] if h is nonnegative, which therefore still applies for the case of α-SR distributions.
To upper bound V (t ), we start by lower bounding H (v). Because h(v) is always nonnegative, H (v) is always nonnegative. When v ≤ r , this will be the only lower bound we use. Otherwise, we lower bound H (v) using the lower bound for h(v) from Lemma 7 when v ≥ r . In particular, if v ≥ r , then
We rewrite this as e H (r )
To upper bound this, we consider e H (r ) r 0 e −H (v ) dv by itself. Note that if v ≤ r , on applying Lemma 8 with v 1 = v and v 2 = r ,
Therefore, e H (r )
Plugging this into our bound for V (t ) yields (2)) and as max{t, r } = r in this case, R(max{t, r }) ≥ α 1/(1−α ) V (t ), as desired.
From the proof of Lemma 3.10 in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] ,
For
It follows that
Single-Item Auctions With Known Budgets
Theorem 3 describes a mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the social welfare, with the constraint that all bidders have a budget that is known. As α tends to 1, the approximation factor tends to that given originally in Chawla et al. [7] . However, it is not known if the given mechanism is optimal, even for MHR distributions.
First, we generalize Lemma 3.1 in Hartline and Roughgarden [16] from the case α = 1, which was also used to prove the original theorem in Chawla et al. [7] . It upper bounds values v in terms of the monopoly price r and the virtual valuation ϕ (α ). 
. Solving for v gives the preceding inequality. Theorem 3. Let 0 < α < 1. For every downward-closed environment with valuations drawn independently from distributions that are α-SR, and with budgets B i for each bidder i, the mechanism that chooses each of the following two mechanisms with probability 1/2 gives a 4 α + 2 α +1 α (2−α )/(1−α )approximation to the optimal social welfare of any budget-feasible mechanism. The resulting mechanism is dominant-strategy incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational, and budget feasible. 
Myerson's mechanism on the resulting instance.
Proof. We start by upper bounding the social welfare of any allocation x. First note that Lemma 10 implies that
if v i ≤ v * i , and 0 otherwise. Additionally, by Lemma 20 in Chawla et al. [7] ,
as an upper bound on the social welfare. We now lower bound the social welfare of the two mechanisms. The social welfare of Mechanism 1 can be lower bounded by
The second inequality follows from Lemma 11. By Theorem 7 in Chawla et al. [7] , Mechanism 2 achieves revenue and therefore social welfare at least
Let W 1 be the social welfare of Mechanism 1 and W 2 the social welfare of Mechanism 2. Then we can upper bound (7) by
Let Mechanism i be the mechanism with the greater social welfare. Therefore, (8) is bounded above
Finally, the mechanism stated in the lemma achieves social welfare at least W i /2, which yields the desired approximation factor.
Single-Item Auctions With Private Budgets
The following theorem describes a mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue, with the constraint that all bidders have a budget that is unknown. As α tends to 1, the approximation factor tends to that given originally in Chawla et al. [7] . However, it is not known if the given mechanism is optimal, even for MHR distributions. Theorem 4. Let 0 < α < 1. For every downward-closed, single-parameter environment with valuations drawn independently from distributions that are α-SR, and with private budgets B i drawn from a known distribution for each bidder i, there exists a mechanism, given in Chawla et al. [7] , that gives a 3(1 + α −1/(1−α ) )-approximation to the optimal revenue.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 14 in Chawla et al. [7] , substitute the bound from Lemma 11; it lower bounds the probability that a valuation exceeds the monopoly price. Lemma 11. [9] Let F be an α-SR distribution with monopoly price r . If 0 < α < 1, then 1 − F (r ) ≥ α 1/(1−α ) .
Multi-Item Auctions With Public Budgets
Finally, we consider a setting with discrete valuations, drawn from the set {1, . . . , L}, and with public budgets, as defined in Bhattacharya et al. [4] . In Theorem 5, we show that the mechanism in Bhattacharya et al. [4] achieves a 192 α ( 2−α α ) 1/(1−α ) -approximation, which matches the bound given in Bhattacharya et al. [4] as α tends to 1.
Theorem 5. Let 0 < α < 1. Consider the setting with multiple bidders and items where each bidder i has a public budget B i , and the valuation of each item by each bidder is drawn independently from an α-SR distribution. Then there exists a mechanism that is universally truthful dominant-strategy incentive compatible and gives a 192 α ( 2−α α ) 1/(1−α ) -approximation to the revenue of the optimal truthfulin-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism.
Proof. Lemma 12 replaces Lemma 13 in the analysis in Bhattacharya et al. [4] . 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution defined on the set {1, . . . , L} with monopoly reserve price r and virtual valuation function ϕ. Then
Proof. As in Bhattacharya et al. [4] , we construct a probability distribution with support [0, L] that approximates F . In particular, letF be such that
for all integers v, whereF is the cumulative distribution function off . Such a distribution can be constructed by lettingf 
Let k * be the integer such that ϕ (v) ≥ αv/2 if and only if v > k * . Note that as ϕ (v) − αv is nondecreasing, ϕ (v) − αv/2 is strictly increasing, and consequently k * is well defined. Then k * − 1/h(k * ) ≤ αk * /2, which on rearranging yields 1/h(k * ) ≥ ((2 − α )k * )/2 and
Therefore, the condition in Lemma 8 holds. This implies that for all v ≤ k * ,
where the second inequality uses the fact that Finally, as in the proof of Lemma 3.3 in Bhattacharya et al. [4] ,
, as desired.
SAMPLE COMPLEXITY
Here we discuss the sample complexity of the mechanisms used in Theorems 6 through 9. These mechanisms require knowledge of the distributions from which the valuations are drawn. We will show how to modify these mechanisms when the distributions are known approximately via samples.
In Cole and Roughgarden [9] , this was done for the single-item auction by modifying the Myerson auction. Our mechanisms will follow the same format. After obtaining the samples, we estimate the distributions and use these in place of the actual distribution. In particular, given m samples, we first discard the ξm − 1 largest samples. We let the empirical quantile of the jth
2m and let the empirical revenue curve be defined as
with straight lines joining successive points. Because we will need to associate an empirical quantile with each value smaller than the ( ξm − 1)th sample, we use the empirical revenue curve to define these quantiles, as follows. We define v (q) · q = R(q) and
We let CR be the convex hull of the actual revenue curve (which is convex for regular distributions). In addition, we let CR be the convex hull of the empirical revenue curve, ϕ the empirical virtual valuation function (i.e., the slope of CR), and r the empirical reserve price (i.e., the largest value such that ϕ (r ) = 0). We will be overloading notation, writing both CR(q) and CR(v (q)), and likewise for CR.
We start by stating results about the empirical revenue curve that will be used to modify mechanisms for the empirical setting. The following is Lemma 6.2 from Cole and Roughgarden [9] and gives a lower bound on the accuracy of samples.
Lemma 13. Let F be a regular distribution. Suppose that m independent samples with values
It will be helpful to identify situations in which (9) holds. Accordingly, we introduce the following notation.
Definition 2.
Let E be the event that outcome (9) occurs for all v ≤ v ξ m .
Note that E holds with probability at least 1 − δ . We use Lemma 13 to prove the following result, which shows that the value of the revenue curve at the empirical reserve price is a good approximation to the revenue at the actual reserve price.
Let ξ be the empirical quantile of the largest retained sample: ξ = 
Proof. We assume that the statement in Lemma 13 holds, which it does with probability 1 − δ . By Lemma 13,
At this point, we consider two cases: q(r ) ≥ ξ and q(r ) < ξ . Case 1: q(r ) ≥ ξ . By the definition of r , CR(r ) ≥ CR(r ), and therefore (10) is bounded below by 1 (1+γ ) 2 CR(r ). We use Lemma 13 again to see that
By the definition of r , CR(r ) ≥ CR(q(v (ξ ))), and therefore (10) is bounded below by 1 (1+γ ) 2 CR(q(v (ξ ))). We use Lemma 13 again to see that
Because CR is convex and by assumption v (ξ ) < r , it follows that
Finally, by Lemma 13, q(v (ξ )) ≤ q(v (ξ ))(1 + γ ) 2 , and therefore we obtain a final bound of 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 CR(r ), as desired.
The following lemma from Cole and Roughgarden [9] describes the accuracy of the empirical revenue curves. Lemma 15. Assume that E holds. Then for all empirical quantiles q(r ) ≥ q ≥ ξ ,
If q(r ) ≤ q, then the right inequality holds, and the left inequality becomes
Proof. The upper bound on CR(q) follows from Lemma 6.3 in Cole and Roughgarden [9] . To prove the lower bound, we choose j so that t j+1 = 2(j+1)−1 2m ≥ q ≥ 2j−1 2m = t j . As defined in Cole and Roughgarden [9] , the values t i denote the empirical quantiles of the samples. As stated in Cole and Roughgarden [9] ,
(by Lemma 6.3 in Cole and Roughgarden [9] ) Otherwise, if q ≥ q(r ), then,
(by Lemma 6.3 in Cole and Roughgarden [9] )
Revenue of the VCG-L Mechanism
We start with the VCG-L mechanism as defined in Dhangwatnotai et al. [11] . As described previously, the VCG-L mechanism runs VCG but with lazy reserve prices. In particular, after running VCG, all bidders who bid less than their reserve price are removed, and the remaining bidders are charged the maximum of their reserve price and the VCG payment. When only given access to samples, we use the empirical reserve price rather than the actual reserve price.
By a simple application of Lemma 14, we obtain the following bound. Theorem 6. The expected revenue of the empirical VCG-L mechanism with k classes of bidders is
fraction of the expected efficiency of the VCG mechanism, given m ≥ 6(1+γ )
Proof. We show that with probability 1 − kδ, the empirical VCG-L mechanism achieves revenue at least a 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 fraction of the VCG-L mechanism with total access to the distributions. The statement of the theorem then follows from Theorem 2.
Assume that E holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with probability 1 − kδ . For each bidder i, fix the valuations of all other bidders to be v −i , and let t i be bidder i's VCG threshold. Let r i be the reserve price for bidder i, and let r i be the empirical reserve price. In each of the two mechanisms, bidder i is charged either its VCG threshold t i or the corresponding reserve price (r i in the original mechanism and r i in the empirical mechanism.) We show that in each of the four possible cases, the expected revenue from bidder i (over bidder i's possible valuations) in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 fraction of the expected revenue from bidder i in the original VCG-L mechanism. Taking the expectation over v −i and summing over all bidders proves the theorem.
Bidder i is charged the same amount in both mechanisms, and the expected revenue from bidder i is also the same.
Bidder i is charged r i in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged r i in the empirical VCG-L mechanism. By Lemma 14, the expected revenue in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 fraction of the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism. Case 3: r i ≤ t i ≤ r i . Bidder i is charged t i in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged r i in the empirical VCG-L mechanism. By the convexity of the revenue curve, the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism is less than CR(r i ). It follows from Lemma 14 that the expected revenue from bidder i in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least a 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 fraction of CR(r i ).
Bidder i is charged r i in the VCG-L mechanism and is charged t i in the empirical VCG-L mechanism. By the convexity of the revenue curve, the expected revenue in the empirical VCG-L mechanism is at least CR(r i ). It follows from Lemma 14 that CR(r i ) is at least a 1−ξ (1+γ ) 2 (1+γ ) 4 fraction of the expected revenue in the VCG-L mechanism.
Single-Item Auctions With Known Budgets
Consider the mechanism in Theorem 3, first given in Chawla et al. [7] . Recall that this mechanism is actually composed of two mechanisms, each chosen with probability 1/2. Mechanism 1 does not need access to the distribution, but Mechanism 2 does, as one of its steps is to run Myerson's mechanism. The sample complexity of a suitably modified version of Myerson's mechanism was already studied in Theorem 6.9 in Cole and Roughgarden [9] . In particular with n bidders, the expected revenue in the sampling setting is at least a (1 − ϵ ) fraction of the expected revenue with total access to the distribution, if given m = Ω n 10 ϵ 7 ln 3 n ϵ samples. This leads to the following theorem. Theorem 7. The mechanism described in Theorem 3, when given access to m = Ω(( n 10 ϵ 7 ) ln 3 n ϵ ) samples per class of bidders, gives a 4 α (1−ϵ ) + 2 α +1 α (2−α )/(1−α ) -approximation to the social welfare of a welfare-optimal budget-feasible mechanism.
Proof. Let W 1 and W 2 be the social welfare of Mechanisms 1 and 2, respectively (with the latter having access to the distribution), as defined in Theorem 3, and let W 2 be the social welfare of Mechanism 2 with access only to samples of the distribution. Additionally, let R 2 and R 2 be the revenue of Mechanism 2 with access to the full distribution and just to samples, respectively.
By Theorem 6.9 in Cole and Roughgarden [9] , (1 − ϵ )R 2 ≤ R 2 . Using the same analysis as for Theorem 3, the upper bound on the social welfare of any allocation (7) can itself be upper bounded by 2 α
The theorem follows by noting that R 2 ≤ W 2 and following the rest of the analysis for Theorem 3.
Single-Item Auctions With Private Budgets
We now consider the mechanism in Theorem 4, first given in Chawla et al. [7] . Let (F, S, G) be the setting where F is the set of distributions from which each bidder's valuation is drawn, S is a matroid set system of allowable sets, and G is the set of distributions from which each bidder's budget is drawn. Let B be the vector of actual budgets, and let v be the vector of bidder valuations. Then we define B as 
.
The proposed mechanism uses a lottery system that we define as follows.
Definition 3. A lottery system L(p, p ) either sets the price of an item at p if p ≥ p /3 or allows the bidder to choose a value a, 2p/p ≤ a ≤ 2/3, and then purchase an item at a price of ap /2 with probability 1/3 + a.
The mechanism is to offer each bidder i the lottery system (T i , r i ), where r i is the reserve price for bidder i. When only given access to samples, we instead offer each bidder i the lottery system (T i , r i ), where r i is the empirical reserve price based on m ≥ 6(1+γ ) γ 2 ξ max{ ln 3 γ , ln 3 δ } samples for some 0 < δ < 1 and γ satisfying γϵm ≥ 4 and (1 + γ ) 2 ≥ 3/2.
Let M be the optimal mechanism, and let M L be the proposed mechanism. Let R M∩B and R M\B be the revenue that M obtains from serving those bidders in B and those not in B, respectively. Additionally, let R M L be the revenue from the proposed mechanism. The following lemma relating R M\B and R M L from Chawla et al. [7] still holds even after modifying the lottery system offered to the bidder.
Before relating R M∩B and R M L , we prove a sequence of lemmas. The first, a slight modification of a claim in Cole and Roughgarden [9] , upper bounds the revenue curve for quantiles less than q(r ). This will allow us to lower bound q(r ).
Lemma 17. Let F be an α-SR distribution with reserve price r . For q ≤ q(r ) and 0 < α < 1,
Proof. By letting q 0 = r in Lemma 6.3 from Cole and Roughgarden [9] and using the fact that
Thus, CR(q) = q · v (q)
The following lemma lower bounds the quantile of the empirical reserve price in terms of the quantile of the actual reserve price. Lemma 18. Let 0 < α ≤ 1, and let F be an α-SR distribution. Then assuming that E holds for the samples from each distribution,
Proof. If q(r ) ≥ q(r ), the result holds trivially; so for the rest of the proof, we will assume that r > r . To simplify the presentation, we let s = 8γ /α. Now assume for the sake of a contradiction that the statement of the lemma does not hold (i.e., that q(r ) < (1 − s)q(r )). We show that this implies that CR(r ) ≥ CR(r ), which contradicts the choice of r . By Lemma 13, CR(r ) = q(r )r ≤ q(r )(1 + γ ) 2 r = CR(r )(1 + γ ) 2 . As r > r , and as by assumption q(r ) < (1 − s)q(r ),
(by Lemma 17) .
On replacing s with 8γ /α in (13) , this becomes
By Lemma 13 again, this is bounded above by CR(r ), yielding CR(r ) < CR(r ), a contradiction. 
Proof. We assume that E holds for the samples from each distribution, which it does with probability 1 − kδ by a union bound. As in Chawla et al. [7] , fix a bidder i, along with (v −i , B) and consequently T i . Additionally, bidder i only contributes to R M∩B if v i ≥ T i . We consider two cases: T i ≥ r and T i ≤ r . The former case retains its proof in Chawla et al. [7] . In particular,
where R X i is the revenue from bidder i in mechanism X. In the case T i ≤ r , as in Lemma 13 in Chawla et al. [7] ,
By Lemma 10 in Chawla et al. [7] , if v i ≥ r , then R M L i ≥ min{r, B i }/3. This occurs with probability 1 − F (r ), and therefore
In the case that min{r, B i } = r , by Lemma 14, the right-hand side is bounded below by (1 − 4γ − ξ )(min{r , B i })(1 − F (r ))/3. In the case that min{r, B i } = B i , by Lemma 18, the right-hand side is bounded below by B i (1 − 8γ α )(1 − F (r ))/3. Therefore, in general 
Combining (15) and (16) gives
We have just shown the preceding inequality in the case T i ≤ r ; but by (14) , it also holds when T i ≥ r . Next we note that when v i ≤ T i , bidder i does not contribute to R M∩B i , and consequently the conditioning can be ignored. Taking the expectation over (v −i , B) and summing over all i yields the lemma.
Combining Lemmas 16 and 19 yields the following theorem. Theorem 8. The mechanism M L performed with n bidders obtains a total revenue that is a 3 1−kδ (1 + )-approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism, given m ≥ 6(1+γ ) 
Multi-Item Auctions With Public Budgets
We now consider the mechanism in Theorem 5, first given in Bhattacharya et al. [4] . Here, there is a set of bidders, a set of items, and a different distribution for the valuations for each (bidder, item) pair. Each item can be assigned to at most one bidder, each bidder can receive only a specified number of items, and each bidder can spend no more than a predetermined budget. In addition, we add a point mass to the empirical distribution at q(ξ ) so that v (q) and q(v) are defined for all quantiles less than ξ and all values greater than v (ξ ), respectively.
A key step in this mechanism is to solve the following linear program LP1 with coefficients derived from the distribution. 1 The optimal solution to LP1 yields a mechanism with the approximation guarantee stated in Theorem 5. It is also the case that a feasible solution of LP1 achieving a solution with value ρ · OPT when substituted into a slight modification of the mechanism will yield an approximation factor of ρ times the factor in Theorem 5. (See Figure 1 ; the original mechanism had a probability of 1/4 in line 4; we use a smaller probability, p/4 for a suitable p < 1, which reduces the expected revenue to p times its previous value.) As we only have access to samples of the distribution, we can only create an approximate form of LP1, which we name LP2, described later. The main challenge is to show that a modification of an optimal solution to LP2 is feasible for LP1 and achieves a good approximation to the optimum of LP1.
Notation: f and ϕ are the approximations to f and ϕ, respectively, derived from the sample-based empirical distribution. Additionally, I is the set of bidders, J is the set of items, B i is the budget of bidder i, n i is the number of items bidder i can obtain, and R i j is the support of the distribution F i j of the valuation of item j by bidder i. The virtual valuation function ϕ i j is derived from F i j . Finally, 18:24 R. Cole and S. Rao Maximize i ∈I j ∈J CR i j (x * i j )
Subject to 1.
j ∈J
x * i j ≤ n i ∀i ∈ I 2.
j ∈J we can lower bound (18) and hence V 3 by
Because x * i j is the optimal solution to LP2, it follows that
yielding a lower bound on V 3 of
i ∈I j ∈J r ∈R i j f i j (r )ϕ i j (r )y i j (r ).
Using the identity r ∈R i j f i j (r )ϕ i j (r )y i j (r ) =
We apply Lemma 15 to obtain a lower bound of
Similarly as before, because (1 − ξ (1 + γ ) 3 ) CR(x * i j ) ≤ CR(z * i j (1 + γ ) e i j ), we lower bound the above by
Theorem 9. The empirical posted-price mechanism in Figure 1 gives an approximation to the optimal truthful-in-expectation Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism with a multiplicative error of 192 α
(1 + γ ) 9 (1 − |I | · |J |δ ), Proof. Using the same proof as in Theorem 3.13 in Bhattacharya et al. [4] , we can show that the mechanism in Figure 1 allocates item j to bidder i with probability 1 6 · y * i j 4 . This follows from the fact that y i j satisfies the constraints of LP1, as stated in Lemma 20. By Lemma 21, the objective function of LP1 at y i j is close to the optimum V 2 , with probability 1 − |I | · |J |δ .
Recall the notation V 2 and V 3 introduced in Definition 4. By the analysis in Theorem 3.14 in Bhattacharya et al. [4] , 1 24 V 2 is the expected revenue guaranteed by Theorem 5. Similarly, the mechanism in Figure 1 yields expected revenue 1 24 E [V 3 ]. By Lemma 21, the former is also a 192 α ( 2−α α ) 1/(1−α ) approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism, yielding the desired bound.
